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THE RIGHT TO SUBLEASE IN NEW YORK:
APPLICATION OF REAL PROPERTY LAW SECTION
226-B
Section 226-b can be understood best in the light of the history and development of the landlord and tenant relationship.As
the medieval system of land tenure withered away, landlord and
tenant relationships proliferated. Over the centuries which intervened, to the present, persistingfeudal attitudes and the realities
of economic power perpetuated those legal principles which favored landlords as against their tenants. The resultant imbalance
in the construction and enforcement of lease provisionspersisted
long into this century.
Within a lifetime, the major wars, the consequences of industrialization, the gravitationalpull of agriculturalworkers to the
city, have resulted in urban congestion and a scarcity of residen-,
tial housing. In New York, these factors and an increasingsensitivity on the part of law makers to the electorate (more tenants
than landlords)tipped the scales of landlord and tenant law away
from its historic bias. This shift in legal attitude has been evidenced by legislative adoption of rent controls, recognition of the
warranty of habitability, imposition of multiple dwelling safeguards and a myriad of other laws designed to protect tenants.,
In the ordinary course of events, New York Real Property Law
section 226-b 2 would have been just one more bit of evidence of an
accelerating trend toward landlord-tenant legal reform. On its face,
the statute seems to confer a clear right upon tenants-the right to
sublease in the absence of a reasonable refusal by a landlord-and
simultaneously to restrain landlords with an equally clear prohibition
against unreasonably withholding consent to a proposed sublease. 3
1. Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman, 107 Misc. 2d 74, 80-81, 437 N.Y.S.2d 835, 839
(App. Term 1st Dep't 1980) (Asch, J., dissenting).
2. N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
3. Id. The section reads as follows:
Right to sublease or assign.
1. A tenant renting a residence in a dwelling having four or more residential

units shall have the right to sublease or assign his premises, subject to the written
consent of the landlord given in advance of the sublease or assignment. Such con-
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Due in large part to careless drafting, however, section 226-b has
instead become the focus of substantial litigation,4 with potentially
serious ramifications for the rights of tenants in New York. Although the statute was originally applauded as a dilution of the
hornbook certainty that a landlord's consent to a sublease or assignment "may be refused for any or even no reason,' 5 a recent series of
court decisions, spawned under the statute, have called this optimistic evaluation into serious question.6 In view of the potentially wide
purview of the statute, (affecting nearly one million apartments in
New York City alone, 7 and over three million rental units statewide 8), the resulting confusion over the statute's ultimate impact is a
sent shall not be unreasonably withheld. If the landlord unreasonably withholds consent for such sublease or assignment, the landlord must release the tenant from the
lease upon request of the tenant.
2. The tenant shall inform the landlord of his intent to sublease or assign by
mailing a notice of such intent by registered or certified mail. Such request shall be
accompanied by the written consent thereto of any co-tenant or guarantor of such
lease and a statement of the name, business and home address of the proposed sublessee or assignee. Within ten days after the mailing of such request, the landlord
may ask the sender thereof for additional information as will enable the landlord to
determine if rejection of such request shall be unreasonable. Within thirty days after the mailing of the request for consent, or of the additional information reasonably asked for by the landlord, whichever is later, the landlord shall send a notice to
the sender thereof of his consent or, if he does not consent, his reasons therefore.
Landlord's failure to send such a notice shall be deemed to be a consent to the
proposed subletting or assignment. If the landlord consents, the premises may be
sublet or assigned in accordance with the request, but the tenant thereunder, shall
nevertheless remain liable for the performance of tenant's obligations under said
lease.
3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to leases entered into or renewed before the effective date of this section, nor to public housing and other units
for which there are constitutional or statutory criteria covering admission thereto
nor to a proprietary lease, viz.: a lease to, or held by, a tenant entitled thereto by
reason of ownership of stock in a corporate owner of premises which operates the
same on a cooperative basis.
4. See text accompanying notes 46-118 infra.
5. Roberts, Property, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 353, 353 (1977). The statute is cited in an
evaluation of "progress" made by the New York State legislature in the area of property law.
6. See, e.g., Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman, 107 Misc. 2d 74, 437 N.Y.S.2d 835
(App. Term 1st Dep't 1980); Grayshaw v. New Amsterdam Apts. Co., 106 Misc. 2d 936, 436
N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup, Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1981); Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, N.Y.L.J., June 18,
1980, at 11, col. 5M (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980), affd, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 27, 1981, at 5, col. 3T
(App. Term 1st Dep't 1980); 39 Remsen Co. v. Braune, N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1980, at 11, col.
6M (Civ. Ct. Kings Cty. 1980).
7. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1980, at BI, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1980, at 31, col. 3.
8. See generally NEw YORK STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1979-1980, at 76 (indicating that
there are three million rental units occupied statewide). Units situated in buildings with less
than four separate apartments are not covered by section 226-b. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §
226-b(l) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss2/9

2

Kaufman: The Right to Sublease in New York: Application of Real Property L
1982]

THE RIGHT TO SUBLEASE

regrettable (and avoidable) episode in the annals of New York landlord and tenant law. This note attempts to ascertain the scope of
section 226-b in light of its foundation in the body of preexisting
New York case law, 9 its legislative history, 10 and its interpretation
by the courts." In addition, this note addresses the problems, both
practical and theoretical in nature, which have arisen or might conceivably arise in connection with the statute's application,' 2 and sets
forth suggestions for possible prevention or resolution of these
issues.',3
THE STATE OF THE LAW PRIOR To SECTION

226-B

In New York, at common law, a tenant for a definite term had
an unrestricted right to sublet, absent an express statute or contract
provision to the contrary. 14 This basic rule was predicated on the
common law's adherence to the principle of free alienation of land,
and was intended to encourage maximum utilization of land in the
public interest.' 5 The New York common law is consistent in this
respect with that of other jurisdictions.' At the other extreme, however, New York cases prior to the enactment of section 226-b also
held that, where a lease contained an express prohibition against
subletting without the landlord's prior approval, the landlord had the
right to refuse consent arbitrarily for any reason whatsoever, or for
no reason at all.17 This proposition, based on freedom-of-contract
principles, 18 was also in accord with the law in other jurisdictions.'
9. See text accompanying notes 14-32 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 33-45 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 46-118 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 119-153 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 154-162 infra.
14. Eten v. Luyster, 60 N.Y. 252 (1875); Fleisch v. Schnaier, 119 A.D. 815 (Ist Dep't
1907).
15. Cf. De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 493 (1852) (as applied to land held in fee).
16. See, e.g.. Mattox v. Wescott, 156 Ala. 492, 47 So. 170 (1908); Mitchell v. Young,
80 Ark. 441, 97 S.W. 454 (1906); Steele v. State, 191 Ind. 350, 132 N.E. 739 (1921); Leslie v.
Sherman, 157 Kan. 157, 139 P.2d 133 (1943); Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire v.
Voudoumas, 84 N.H. 387, 151 A. 81 (1930); Gripentrog v. Wahpeton, 126 N.W.2d 230 (N.D.
1964); Rosenberg v. Taft, 94 Vt. 458, 111 A. 583 (1920).
17. Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel Martinique Assocs., 16 A.D.2d 899, 228 N.Y.S.2d
807 (1st Dep't 1962), aJfd, 12 N.Y.2d 339, 190 N.E.2d 10, 239 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1963); Arlu
Assocs. v. Rosner, 14 A.D.2d 272, 220 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Ist Dep't 1961), affid, 12 N.Y.2d 693,
185 N.E.2d 913, 233 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1962); Ogden v. Riverview Holding Corp., 134 Misc.
149, 234 N.Y.S. 678 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty.), affd, 226 A.D. 882, 235 N.Y.S. 850 (1st Dep't
1929); Sarner v. Kantor, 123 Misc. 469, 205 N.Y.S. 760 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1924).
18. See Rowe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 46 N.Y.2d 62, 67-68, 385 N.E.2d 566, 569,
412 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (1978).
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In practice, a lease clause concerning subletting is likely to fall
into a gray area between the two common law extremes. As Rasch
notes: "Tenants usually try to get some modification of the arbitrary
right to withhold consent to assignments and sublettings, if they can-

not eliminate the restriction entirely."20 One common modification
involves persuading the landlord to agree that he will not unreasona-

bly withhold his consent to a proposed assignment or sublease. 21 The
language of this concession, however, must be carefully drafted so as
to take the form of an express covenant by the landlord, rather than
a mere qualification upon the tenant's right to sublease. In Butterick

PublishingCo. v. Fulton & Elm Leasing Co. 2 ' and in Sarnerv. Kantor, 23 the absence of such an express agreement by the landlord prevented plaintiffs from recovering damages for breach.24 As succinctly
stated by Rasch, "[a] qualification of the tenant's covenant not to
assign without consent by the addition of the phrase, 'but such consent will not be unreasonably withheld,' does not bind the landlord to
anything. 25
In the case of an effectively drafted clause, in situations where a
landlord in fact unreasonably withheld his consent, the common law
provided the tenant with two distinct remedies. In the first instance,
the tenant could disregard the negative covenant and "'deal with his
property

quired,'

. .

",26

as he [the tenant] would if no license were re-

although this option was susceptible to certain procedu-

19. See, e.g., Walker v. Wadley, 124 Ga. 275, 52 S.E. 904 (1905); Kew v. Trainor, 150
Ill. 150, 37 N.E. 223 (1894); Jacobs v. Klawans, 225 Md. 147, 169 A.2d 677 (1961); Gruman
v. Investors Diversified Servs., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377 (1956); Pond v. Holbrook, 32
Minn. 291, 20 N.W. 232 (1884).
20. 1 J. RAsCH, NEW YORK LANDLORD AND TENANT: SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS § 125,
at 118 (1950).
21. Id.
22. 132 Misc. 366, 229 N.Y.S. 86 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1928). The subject clause provided: "'The tenant agrees that it will not assign, mortgage, or alienate this lease ... nor let.
nor underlet. . . without the written consent of the landlord, but the consent to sublet will not
be unreasonably withheld.'" Id. at 368, 229 N.Y.S. at 88 (emphasis in original).
23. 123 Misc. 469, 205 N.Y.S. 760 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1924). The clause read:
"'[T]he tenant shall not assign or sublet this agreement, or underlet or underlease the premises *** without the landlord's written consent first had and obtained *** Nothing herein
contained shall permit the landlord to unreasonably withhold his consent to any sublease.'" Id.
at 470, 205 N.Y.S. at 760.
24. But see Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Eastway Plaza, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 509, 158
N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cty. 1957). The court there held that a similar clause gave
rise to a cause of action for the tenant seeking damages from the landlord.
25. 1 J. RASCH, supra note 20, § 125, at 119.
26. Butterick Pub. Co. v. Fulton & Elm Leasing Co., 132 Misc. 366, 369, 229 N.Y.S.
86, 89 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1928) (brackets supplied by court) (quoting Sear v. House Prop-
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ral disadvantages.2 7 Alternatively, the tenant could sue for a declaratory judgment to permit subletting. In either case, assuming the
unreasonableness of the landlord's refusal, the sublease would be effected over the landlord's objections. 9
Although the direct relevance of the earlier common law approach to the ongoing litigation involving section 226-b has been
questioned, 30 the existence of the two distinct remedies available to
tenants at common law is important from an historical perspective.
The New York legislature, in enacting section 226-b, opted for a
measure which effectively placed all subject leases31 into the uncharted legal terrain between a strict contractual prohibition against
subletting on the one hand and a complete absence of any relevant
language on the other.32 Had the legislature chosen instead to adopt
one of the two common law extremes, the precedential value of the
early New York case law would be undeniable. But the statute, as
drafted, works to obstruct the landlord's absolute right to restrict
transfers through a prohibition against the arbitrary withholding of
consent, while at the same time vesting in the tenant an apparently
somewhat-less-than-absolute right to sublet. As a result, courts confronted with the problem of the actual application of the statute
have been forced to look in other directions for guidance.
LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY

A number of courts have considered the legislative history of
section 226-b,33 but the paucity and incongruity of recorded stateerty & Invest. Soc'y, L.R. 1880-81, 16 Ch. Div. 387, reported in 50 L.J.N.S. 79, at 89
(1881)).

27. See 1 J. RASCH, supra note 20, § 126, at 120: "The landlord may still assert his
rights, alleging a breach of the covenant, and it will then be necessary to prove that ...

the

consent was unreasonably withheld. It is difficult to state categorically in advance of litigation
whether the tenant's position will be upheld."
28. Mann v. Steinberg, 188 Misc. 652, 64 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1946);
Butterick Pub. Co. v. Fulton & Elm Leasing Co., 132 Misc. 366, 229 N.Y.S. 86 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cty. 1928); Sarpor v. Kantor, 123 Misc. 469, 205 N.Y.S. 760 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty.
1924).
29. See authorities cited notes 26 & 28 supra.
30. See note 74 infra and accompanying text.
31. The statute explicitly limits its effect to tenants in dwellings having four or more
residential units. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). No reason
for the exclusion is apparent in the statute's legislative history, but it can be surmised that the
legislature hoped to protect owner-occupier landlords from being forced to accept an unfamiliar subtenant-not only as an obligor, but as a neighbor.
32. See id. § 226-b.
33. E.g., Conrad v. Third Sutton Realty Co., 81 A.D.2d 50, 439 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1st
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ments by the legislators has made this an arduous task. In fact, New
York Real Property Law section 226-b, in its current form, 3 is the
third version of a statute originally enacted in 1975 a3 and subsequently revised twice.36 The rapid succession of the revisions, one
within two months of initial passage and the second within ten
months of that, suggests that the legislature itself was less than
pleased with its product.
On its face, section 226-b confers an important right on New
York tenants. Both the first and second3 7 versions of the law provided that: "A tenant.

. .

shall have the right to sublease his prem-

ises, subject to the written consent of the landlord, given in advance
of the sublease. Such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld." 38
It is there that the similarities between the two bills end, however,
for the first version of the statute provided in subdivision one that,
"if the landlord unreasonably withholds consent for such sublease, he
must agree to release the tenant from the lease or accept the sublessee." 39 But the second version amended this sentence to read: "If the
landlord unreasonably withholds consent for such sublease, the landlord must release the tenantfrom the lease upon request of the tenant."40 In the first instance, there were apparently two alternatives
under the statute in the event of a landlord's unreasonable withholding of consent: Either the tenant would be released from the lease, or
the landlord would accept the sublessee. It was unclear, however,
Dep't 1981).
34. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
35. 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 146 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)).
36. Id. ch. 548 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981)); 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 198 (codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)).
37. 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 146 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)); id. ch. 548 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 226-b
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)). The third version of the statute amends its predecessor simply
by adding the words "or assign" or "or assignment" after the word "sublease" in every case.
See 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 198 (codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981)). For purposes of comparison in this section, only the first two versions need be
considered. But see text accompanying notes 119-124 infra (discussion of importance of final
amendment).
38. 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 146 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)); id. ch. 548 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)) (emphasis added).
39. Id. ch. 146 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981)) (emphasis added).
40. Id. ch. 548 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981)) (emphasis added).
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who was to choose between these mutually exclusive remedies. This
issue was important, for the two possible scenarios had widely diverse consequences. In one case, the tenant could force the landlord
to accept his sublessee, and deprive the landlord of a substantial degree of control over the temporary disposition of his property. In the
other case, the landlord could choose to release the tenant from the
lease, rather than accept the sublessee, and thereby create a potentially serious financial problem for the tenant.4 1 The effect would

have been to force an already overtaxed judicial system to decide, on
a case-by-case basis, which remedy was appropriate.
On all but a theoretical level, however, this issue has become
moot, for in both the second and final versions of the statute, only
one remedy is expressly made available to tenants in the event of an
unreasonable refusal by the landlord: release from the lease, this
time clearly at tenant's option. 2 By way of a rather curious tradeoff,
tenants won an unambiguous right to wield one remedy, while the
language importing a second and more powerful remedy vanished
completely. The speedy revision may have been prompted by a letter
from the Secretary of State to the Governor's Counsel, which read in
part:
[T] hat provision with respect to the release of the tenant from the
lease ... is poorly drawn. If the landlord is found by a

court-which only could determine the issue-that the landlord
has unreasonably withheld consent [sic], it should have been simply provided that the tenant is released from the lease

. . .

rather

43
than to call for the act of the landlord to agree to such release

In a cryptic memorandum after the amendment's approval, State
Senator Donald M. Halperin, the Senate sponsor of both versions of
the statute, commented only on the additions to the first version,
avoiding any mention of the important deletion that had been
made. 4 Halperin remarked, "Chapter 146 of the Laws of 1975
added section 226 to the real property law and granting [sic] tenants
41. See text accompanying notes 119-127 infra.
42. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); 1975 N.Y. Laws ch.
548 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)).
43. Conrad v. Third Sutton Realty Co., 81 A.D.2d 50, 54, 439 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 (Ist
Dep't 1981) (quoting Letter from Secretary of State to Governor's Counsel (May 28, 1975))

(emphasis in original).
44. Memoranda of Senator Donald M. Halperin, in 1975 NEw YORK STATE
TIvE ANNUAL

LEGISLA-

305. The additions so noted dealt mainly with the notice requirement changes

involving section 226-b(2); section 226-b(I) is not mentioned specifically.
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the right to sublease. The amendments would benefit both landlord
and tenant by stating in clearer language the obligations of both
parties. ' 5
No litigation arose under the first version of section 226-b, and
the issue of the true legislative intent behind both the original statute
and its successors remained dormant for several years. Now that the
statute has been invoked, however, courts have sifted through its legislative history for clues to its application, often arriving at very different conclusions.
RECENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION

226-B

Laboring under the dual burden of an unclear legislative intent
and an absence of applicable common law, a number of recent decisions have struggled to determine what remedies are available to tenants under section 226-b. The majority of these cases, significantly,
have involved nearly identical fact patterns. In the typical situation,
a tenant, intending to sublease, complied with the notice requirements set forth under subdivision two of the statute,"6 and the landlord responded with a prima facie unreasonable withholding of consent.'7 Despite highly similar circumstances, however, different
results were achieved, as the courts searched the common law and
legislative history for a valid approach to the remedy issue. In the
lower courts, final judgment was rendered for the landlord in Pacer
Realty Associates v. Lasky48 and 39 Remsen Co. v. Braune,49 while
in Kruger v. Page Management Co.50 and 68th St. Co. v. FyjisWalker,5" the tenant emerged victorious.52 At the appellate level, the
45.

Id.

46. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
47. See, e.g., Kruger v. Page Management Co., 105 Misc. 2d 14, 34, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295,
308 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980).
48. N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1980, at 11, col. 5M (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Cty.), aff'd, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
27, 1981, at 5, col. 3T (App. Term 1st Dep't 1980).
49. N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1980, at 11, col. 6M (Civ. Ct. Kings Cty. 1980).
50. 105 Misc. 2d 14, 432 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980).

51. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1980, at 10, col. 7B (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980), rev'd, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 1, 1981, at 10, col. 7B (App. Term 1st Dep't 1981).
52.

Two other early lower.court cases revolving around section 226-b are largely inappli-

cable to the present discussion. Feldman v. Simon Bros. Management Co., N.Y.L.J., July 9,
1980, at 6, col. 6T (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980), was decided upon a different set of facts,

involving an apartment "swap," rather than a true "sublet," and thus is not directly analogous,
although here again the tenants received a judgment in their favor. Id. Mince v. Jonas Equities, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 1980, at 10, col. 5B (App. Term 1st Dep't 1980), involved a
plaintiff-tenant who sued to recover her security deposit, retained by defendant-landlord after
the plaintiff's attempt to sublease in spite of an arbitrary refusal to consent by the landlord.
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conflict continued, with a judgment in favor of the landlord in Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman,53 and a judgment for the tenant in
Conrad v. Third Sutton Realty Co.5
The Dispute in the Lower Courts
Both Remsen and Pacer were actions commenced by the landlords in order to recover possession of the subject apartments after a
tenant's sublease in the face of the landlord's refusal of consent. In
Remsen, the lease contained an express clause requiring the prior
written consent of the landlord to the sublease.5 5 In Pacer, no such
clause was specifically noted or detailed. 8 Yet outside of this slight
variation,57 the decisions were substantially identical, with the court
in Pacer, in fact, citing heavily from the Remsen opinion.58
Both decisions focused on the legislative intent of the amended
statute and on the deletion of the original language contained in the
short-lived first version. Thus, Judge Cohen, in Remsen, held:
[T]urning to the applicability of section 226-b .

.

. the tenants'

remedies are either to remain as tenant under the lease, or demand
The court, unfortunately, did not touch upon the disputed issue of whether the proposed subtenancy could have been created despite the landlord's opposition, although the plaintiff did in

fact recover her security deposit and gain release from her obligations under the lease. The
Mince case is noteworthy in one respect, however: The plaintiff's failure to supply the landlord
with the names of the proposed sublessees, a technical violation of the notice requirements of
226-b(2), was deemed "not critical here in the face of the landlords' stated position that any
sublease was 'totally out of the question.'" Id.
53. 107 Misc. 2d 74, 437 N.Y.S.2d 835 (App. Term. 1st Dep't 1980).
54. 81 A.D.2d 50, 439 N.Y.S.2d 376 (lst Dep't 1981).
55. N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1980, at 11, col. 5M.
56. N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1980, at 11, col. 5M.
57. At least two cases have determined that a provision in a lease was of independent
importance in determining whether a tenant could induce a landlord to accept his sublessee. In
Bendes v. Albert, N.Y.L.J., June 3, 1981, at 6, col. 4B (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1981), the court
held that section 226-b "does not deprive Tenant of the benefits of Landlord's covenant independent of the statute." Id. at 6, col. 6M. In O'Rourke v. Charles H. Greenthal & Co., Inc.,
N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1981, at 10, col. 7B (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1981), the court held that "the
Legislature, by enacting RPL section 226-b, did not intend to abrogate contractual rights resulting from agreements entered into between an owner and a tenant." Id. at 11, col. lB. The
majority of courts ruling on section 226-b, however, have considered the statute to be controlling regardless of any clause in the lease. See, e.g., Kruger v. Page Management Co., 105
Misc. 2d 14, 432 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980).
58. See N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1980, at 11, col. 5M. Although Pacerwas published first in
time, the Remsen case was actually decided earlier. Judge Pellegrino, apparently more cognizant of the public interest in the decision, simply released his opinion to the press more rapidly. This explains the incongruity of the citation to Remsen (published July 17, 1980, see
N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1980, at 11, col. 6M) in Pacer (published June 18, 1980, see N.Y.L.J.,
June 18, 1980, at 11, col. 5M).
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that the landlord release the tenant from the lease. .

.

.[The Ten-

ant] asks this court to declare that the subtenancy created should
remain in effect. However, the legislative intent of the statute requires a holding to the contrary. As originally enacted, section
226-b expressly required the landlord to accept the sublessee ....
The intent here is quite clear and the respondent is limited to the
aforementioned remedies.59

This passage is quoted with approval by Judge Pellegrino in Pacer.6 °
These decisions apparently placed a substantially greater emphasis upon the deletion of the coerced-acceptance remedy than did
the statute's Senate sponsor, who failed to note the remedy's disappearance in any public record. 61 Accordingly, the landlord in each
case prevailed despite his unreasonable refusal in apparent violation
of the law. Each subtenancy was terminated and each tenant was
left with the option of either remaining as the tenant or being released upon request. 2 The "right to sublease," ostensibly conferred
by section 226-b on subject tenants, is evidently not a right to sublease at all, but rather a right to request and obtain release from a
lease in the event of an unreasonable withholding of consent to sublet by the landlord. This is certainly a far more limited right than
that apparently vested in the tenant by the untested original version
of the statute, 63 or than that which the statute's title would appear to
indicate. Yet in Pacerthe court was so confident of the validity of its
approach that it was willing to state that "[a] careful reading of the
statute is clear and unambiguous. .4 . . [T] here can be no other logi'6
cal interpretation of this statute.
Within a very short period of time, however, there were two
other interpretations of section 226-b. 3 The first, embodied in a far
more exhaustive opinion than that delivered in either Pacer or Rem-.
59. N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1980, at 11, col. 5M (citation omitted).
60. N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1980, at 11, col. 5M.
61. See Memoranda of Senator Donald M. Halperin, supra note 44, at 305.
62. 39 Remsen Co. v. Braune, N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1980, at 11, col. 5M (Civ. Ct. Kings
Cty. 1980); Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1980, at 11, col. 5M (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. Cty. 1980), aff'd, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 27, 1981, at 5, col. 3T (App. Term 1st Dep't 1980).
63. 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 146 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)).
64. N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1980, at 11, col. 5M.
65. Kruger v. Page Management Co., 105 Misc. 2d 14, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cty. 1980); 68th St. Co. v. Fyjis-Walker, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1980, at 10, col. 7B (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980), rev'd, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 1981, at 10, col. 7B (App. Term Ist Dep't
1981).
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sen, was Kruger v. Page Management Co. 8 Acting Justice Ryp, in
Kruger, found that a tenant indeed had a right to sublet under the
law, and exhibited few qualms about upholding this right. In this
case, the action was instituted by the tenant to compel the defendant-landlord to consent to a proposed sublease. The lease involved
the customary "No Sublet" clause,6 7 and the landlord's response to
the tenant's notice of intent to sublease was found to be arbitrary
and unreasonable . 6 The tenant, acting as his own attorney in this
instance,6 9 relied upon both section 226-b and prior New York case
law to support his contention that his sublease should be effected.
The court stressed its belief that the law, through the courts and
the legislature, has an interest in regulating private econtracts, especially residential leases, "based upon the equitable belief [that] an
enlightened society must to some extent protect its members from
the harsh effect of an unchecked society."'70 Citing case law to this
effect,7 1 as well as numerous examples of statutory intervention in
the realm of residential leases,7 2 the court sought to justify its willingness to intervene in this situation.
The court also found, ultimately, that Mr. Kruger was free to
sublet his apartment, in complete contrast to the Remsen and Pacer
decisions. In fact, the landlord in this case relied almost entirely on
those two decisions, and the Kruger court rejected the argument outright.7 Yet the Kruger court itself failed to identify which of the
various approaches it analyzed-common law doctrine, legislative
history, statutory interpretation, or public policy-was the overriding
factor in its decision. Despite the attention devoted by the court to
the preenactment cases, the bearing of these precedents upon the
case at hand was never clearly established. The prior law was not
mentioned at all in the court's "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law."'74 Similarly, the muddled state of the legislative history pre.66.

105 Misc. 2d 14, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980).

67. Id. at 15-16, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
68. Id. at 34, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
69. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1980, at BI, col. 5; see Kruger v. Page Management Co., 105
Misc. 2d 14, 14, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295, 295 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980).
70. 105 Misc. 2d at 20, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 300 (citing Rowe v. Great At. & Pac. Tea
Co., 46 N.Y.2d 62, 68 (1978)).
71. Id.

72. Id. at 20, 21, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 300, 301.
73.

Id. at 31-32, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 307.

74.

Id. at 33-35, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 308-09. In fact, Judge Cohen, the court in Remsen,

terms any consideration of prior case law to be "completely irrelevant." Interview with the
Honorable Jerome D. Cohen, New York Civil Court Judge, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Oct. 24, 1980)
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vented the court from reaching any firm determination on this
ground, although the opinion noted and then virtually ignored a pubSchumer,
lished statement by the bill's Assembly sponsor, Charles
75
which clearly supported the landlord's contentions.
Even in the Kruger court's discussion of section 226-b itself, it is
difficult to discern the governing principles. The court noted that "a
clear and specific or explicit legislative intent is required to override
the common law."' 76 Yet, failing to discover the requisite clear intent,
the court hedged by finding that the original and amended versions
of the statute both override and confirm the common law. 7 A great
deal of emphasis was placed upon an intricate semantic argument
founded, surprisingly, not upon section 226-b(1), but rather upon
section 226-b(2). Subdivision two deals generally with the technical
notice requirements with which both landlords and tenants must conform, and with a tenant's continued liability after a consensual sublease.7 8 The section also provides that:

Within thirty days after the mailing of the request for consent, or
of the additional information reasonably asked for by the landlord,
whichever is later, the landlord shall send a notice to the sender
thereof of his consent or, if he does not consent, his reasons therefore. Landlord's failure to send such a notice shall be deemed to be
a consent to the proposed subletting or assignment 7
This language differs somewhat from that contained in the original
statute, which stated that, after receipt of the notice, the "landlord
must notify the tenant of his consent or lack thereof .

. .

. If...

no such notice is mailed, the landlord is deemed to have consented to
the sublease." 80 The court, in noting this difference, proceeded to apply an established principle of statutory construction, namely, that
"[t]he word, 'such' when used in a statute must, to be intelligible,
[hereinafter cited as Interview].
75. 105 Misc. 2d at 27, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 304. The court attributed the statement to an
article in the New York Times by Charles Kaiser. The article quoted Schumer as saying that
"'[t]he intent, and I think the effect, of the law is not to allow tenants to hang on to their
apartments but rather to help the tenant who is hard pressed to get out. *** It puts the
obligation on the tenant to find a sublessee but it doesn't require the landlord to take him.'"

Id.
76. Id. at 24, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 303 (citing Hechter v. New York Life Ins. Co., 46
N.Y.2d 34, 39 (1978)).
77. Id. at 32, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
78. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 146 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)) (emphasis added).
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refer to some antecedent usually the last in context unless some compelling contrary reason appears." 81 Thus, the court found that, while
the original statute required only notice of "consent or lack thereof,"
the amended version placed a far greater burden upon the landlord.
Specifically, the landlord must now send a notice containing not only
his refusal to consent (if he so chooses) but also stating his reasons
for refusal. The Kruger landlord's blunt refusal ("We do not grant
you permission to sublet the apartment. We do not choose to have
apartments passed from hand to hand." 82) contained no rational explanation for the refusal. The landlord's failure in this case to deliver
his reasons for refusal was to be his downfall, for the court held that
the "landlord's said response

. . .

shall be deemed, as a matter of

law under section 226-b, as amended, a consent to tenant's request
for a sublease to the proposed sublessees."8' 8
Subdivision two could be the key to the correct interpretation of
section 226-b; but it is difficult to believe that a single word slipped
into the technical notice provisions of a statute whose basic purpose
is spelled out in a separate section could be construed to control the
entire application of the law. Senator Halperin's memorandum again
fails to call attention to any possible significance of the altered language in question,84 and Judge Cohen, the presiding judge in Remsen, dismissed the entire matter out of hand, complaining that Jus85
tice Ryp had "tortured the English language.1

It is at least conceivable that the Kruger decision does, in fact,
turn upon this esoteric distinction involving the word "such." It is
more likely, however, that policy considerations favoring a broad
right to sublease, while perhaps lacking in precedent, were sufficiently convincing to induce the court to arrive at any legal argument to support them. The shortage of residential apartments in the
New York metropolitan area has been well publicized," and section
226-b was explicitly passed to help alleviate this problem by granting
81. Kruger v. Page Management Co., 105 Misc. 2d 14, 31, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295, 307
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980) (citing American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Stettenheim, 177 A.D.
392 (1st Dep't 1917) and 56 N.Y. JUR. Statutes § 146, at 617 (1967)).
82. Id. at 17, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
83. Id. at 34, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
84. See Memoranda of Senator Donald M. Halperin, supra note 44, at 305.
85. Interview, supra note 74.
86. See NEW YORK STATE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON RENTAL HOUSING, REPORT
(March 1980), cited in Kruger v. Page Management Co., 105 Misc. 2d 14, 33, 432 N.Y.S.2d
295, 308 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980).
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some advantage to New York tenants.8 7 And the Kruger court hints
that this may indeed have been the overriding concern, stating:
[T/he right to, or [to] restrict, a sublease is a valuable right to both
landlord and tenant. . . .Moreover, this court takes judicial notice
of the fact. . . that in New York County, generally,. . . there has

been and still is a serious shortage of well-maintained residential
apartments at reasonable rents. .

.

.Surely, subject rent-stabilized

apartment is a valuable asset as well as a right in inflationary
1980.88

The Kruger decision is notable for one final twist, for the court
placed an important limitation on the tenant. The proposed sublease,
allowed by the court, could only be executed at a rent "not to exceed
the rent required to be paid under tenant's subject lease," 89 the court
declaring that it, "in the interests of justice and equity, will not allow either party to profit from this declaratory action. .

.

. This

would be contrary to the true purposes of section 226-b as
amended."'9 0 This limitation is remarkable, if only for its complete
lack of legal support. Nothing in the statute, its legislative history, or
the prior case law, for that matter, indicates that a tenant should be
prohibited from subletting for an amount either higher or lower than
his own rent. In an astounding feat of legal legerdemain, the Kruger
court created this limitation out of thin air.
A subsequent case, 68th St. Co. v. Fyjis-Walker,91 clearly delineated the developing rift between the literal interpretation of the
statute under Remsen and Pacer,and the more creative construction
utilized in the Kruger decision. Decided once again on similar facts,
Fyjis-Walker unequivocally supported the Kruger court's determination of the availability of not one, but two, options reserved to the
tenant under the statute: "Where a landlord unreasonably withholds
permission to sublet, tenant has the option of treating this as a consent to sublet or of notifying landlord that he/she chooses to be released from the lease."9' 2 In following the Kruger lead, the FyjisWalker court interestingly cited only Kruger and Feldman v. Simon
87. See Conrad v. Third Sutton Realty Co., 81 A.D.2d 50, 439 N.Y.S.2d 376, 380 (1st
Dep't 1981); Memoranda of Senator Donald M. Halperin, supra note 44, at 305.
88. 105 Misc. 2d at 33, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 308 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 34, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
90. Id. at 33, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
91. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1980, at 10, col. 7B (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980), rev'd, N.Y.L.J.
Apr. 1, 1981, at 10, col. 7B (App. Term Ist Dep't 1981).
92. Id.
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Bros. Management Co.,93 to the notable exclusion of the conflicting
Remsen and Pacer decisions, in upholding the subtenancy already
created. In sharp contrast to Kruger, however, the Fyjis-Walker decision failed to place the express restriction on the ability of the tenant to increase the rent to the subtenant which is contained in the
prior decision.
The Dispute on Appeal

At the appellate level, the Remsen/Pacer answer to the question
of which remedies were available to tenants under section 226-b was
adopted by the appellate term in Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman."
The Lexann court reasoned:
We believe that a careful textual analysis of section 226-b of the
Real Property Law points ineluctably to one and only one acceptable interpretation of the remedies available to a tenant when a
landlord unreasonably withholds consent to sublet, that is: the tenant may decide to forego the subletting and remain in occupancy or
may elect to be released from further leasehold obligations. It may
be contended that the law gives but only to take away .... 91
In addition, the Lexann court delivered what might be construed as
a mild rebuke to the creative interpretation given to the statute by
the Kruger court: "'[W]here a statute is framed in language so
plain as to make an explanation superfluous, one will not be attempted . . . . The function of the courts is to enforce statutes, not
to usurp the power of legislation .... ' ""
While affirming the end result achieved in Remsen and Pacer,
however, the Lexann court fashioned an interpretative approach of
its own, relying heavily upon the perceived similarity of section
226-b to an earlier statute, New York Real Property Law section
236,97 as the basis for its decision. The court reasoned:
93. N.Y.L.J., July 9, 1980, at 6, col. 6T (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980). For a brief discussion of the Feldman case, see note 52 supra.

94. 107 Misc. 2d 74, 437 N.Y.S.2d 835 (App. Term Ist Dep't 1980).
95. Id. at 77-78, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
96.

Id. at 79, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (quoting MCKINNEY'S STATUTES § 71, at 138-39

(1971)).
97.

N.Y. REAL PROP LAW § 236 (McKinney 1980) provides as follows:

Assignment of lease of a deceased tenant
Notwithstanding any contrary provision contained in any lease hereafter made
which affects premises demised for residential use, or partly for residential and

partly for professional use, the executor, administrator or legal representative of a
deceased tenant under such a lease, may request the landlord thereunder to consent
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Section 236 of the Real Property Law . . . is an obvious forerunner of section 226-b. The intent of the earlier statute is to protect
the estate of a deceased tenant from a residential leasehold liability
when the landlord unreasonably refuses consent to a sublet. It gives
no right to foist a new and different tenant on a landlord, regardless of his unreasonable refusal to accept the proposed subtenant.
Section 226-b similarly bestows no such right.98
The analogy drawn between sections 236 and 226-b is questionable.
The fact that a situation has arisen where section 236 may be in-

voked necessarily implies that the original tenant will not be returning to the apartment. Therefore, the availability of only one
remedy for the decedent's estate-release from the lease-represents
adequate protection. In the case of a section 226-b tenant wishing to
return to his apartment after expiration of the sublease, however, the

single remedy of release is often unsatisfactory and may result in
to the assignment of such a lease, or to the subletting of the premises demised
thereby. Such request shall be accompanied by the written consent thereto of any
co-tenant or guarantor of such lease and a statement of the name, business and
home addresses of the proposed assignee or sublessee. Within ten days after the
mailing of such request, the landlord may ask the sender thereof for additional information as will enable the landlord to determine if rejection of such request shall
be unreasonable. Within thirty days after the mailing of the request for consent, or
of the additional information reasonably asked for by the landlord, whichever is
later, the landlord shall send a notice to the sender thereof of his election to terminate said lease or to grant or refuse his consent. Landlord's failure to send such a
notice shall be deemed to be a consent to the proposed assignment or subletting. If
the landlord consents, said lease may be assigned in accordance with the request
provided a written agreement by the assignee assuming the performance of the tenant's obligations under the lease is delivered to the landlord in form reasonably satisfactory to the landlord,.or the premises may be sublet in accordance with the
request, as the case may be, but the estate of the deceased tenant, and any other
tenant thereunder, shall nevertheless remain liable for the performance of tenant's
obligations under said lease. If the landlord terminates said lease or unreasonably
refuses his consent, said lease shall be deemed terminated, and the estate of the
deceased tenant and any other tenant thereunder shall be discharged from further
liability thereunder as of the last day of the calendar month during which the landlord was required hereunder to exercise his option. If the landlord reasonably refuses his consent, said lease shall continue in full force and effect, subject to the right
to make further requests for consent hereunder. Any request, notice or communication required or authorized to be given hereunder shall be sent by registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested. This act shall not apply to a proprietary
lease, viz.: a lease to, or held by, a tenant entitled thereto by reason of ownership of
stock in a corporate owner of premises which operates the same on a cooperative
basis. Any waiver of any part of this section shall be void as against public policy.
98. 107 Misc. 2d at 79, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 838. The court offered no concrete evidence,
and this author has not located any, to support the contention that section 226-b was formulated with 236 in mind.
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financial hardshipY9
Lexann's value as precedent in the area of New York subleasing
law was tempered by a strong dissent,100 which maintained that the
majority incorrectly interpreted the statute as having the effect of
merging all prior remedies (both common law and statutory) into a
single right to terminate the lease. Concluding a particularly eloquent public-policy argument in favor of relatively unfettered freedom to sublease, 101 the dissent argued:
Long before this exhibition of legislative solicitude for the rights of
tenants, one area in which the common law had been quite protective of the tenants' rights was with respect to the assignment or
subletting of the leasehold. Even in the formative days of the landlord and tenant law, the public policy supporting the free alienation
of land was seen as stronger than the policy protecting landlords. .

.

. In the absence of a clear directive from the legislature

that its amendment of § 226-b of the Real Property Law was
designed to curtail the common law and the statutory rights of the
tenant to assign or sublet rented premises, it is my view that the
section provides additional remedies rather than limits those alternatives previously in existence. The tenants in the instant matter
therefore, in my opinion, have the option of either terminating the
lease or subletting the premises upon the recalcitrance of the landlord, in accordance with the provisions of the lease. 02
The Lexann decision was greeted in the lower courts with decidedly mixed reviews. In Grayshaw v. New Amsterdam Apartments
Co.,103 the court indicated its agreement with the single-remedy
principle laid down in Lexann, noting that "[h]ad the Legislature
intended that landlords be required to consent to subleases and assignments it need merely have said just that and nothing more."1 04
Groban v. Yorkshire Towers Co.105 was also decided in accordance
with Lexann, although the court there had misgivings, stating: "The
statute's obvious legislative purpose is to enhance not curtail the
rights of tenants, and the last sentence of its first paragraph should
be interpreted as adding a remedy not available under common law
99.

See text accompanying notes 124-127 infra.

100. 107 Misc. 2d at 80-81, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 838-39 (Asch, J., dissenting).
101.

See text accompanying note 1 supra.

102.

107 Misc. 2d at 81, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 839 (Asch, J., dissenting).

103.

106 Misc. 2d 936, 436 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1981).

104. Id. at 940, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 806 (emphasis in original).
105.

N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1981, at 13, col. 3T (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1981).
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rather than as constituting the sole remedy."' 06 Pacer was affirmed
on the basis of Lexann,'07 and Fyjis-Walker was reversed. 08
In other cases, however, the lower courts resisted the Lexann
interpretation. In granting a subtenant's motion for an injunction
against landlord interference with her possession, the court in Gilbert
v. Glenwood Management Co.'09 observed: "The determination of
the Appellate Term is still in a state of flux. .... The dissenting
opinion of Justice Asch in the Lexann ease may very well be a basis
for reversing or modifying the Appellate Term decision.""' 0 Another
decision, O'Rourke v. Charles H. Greenthal & Co.,"' also granted a
plaintiff-subtenant's motion for a preliminary injunction in the face
of Lexann.112
In June, 1981, the appellate division confirmed the suspicions of
the Groban and Gilbert courts that Lexann might not be upheld, and
provided new evidence of the tension between the courts advocating
a single remedy for tenants under the statute and those in favor of
multiple remedies. Conrad v. Third Sutton Realty Co.," 8 in what is
clearly the most significant decision involving section 226-b to date,
resurrected the notion first advanced in the Kruger decision that the
additional remedy the tenants sought could be constructed with reference to subdivision two of the statute, rather than subdivision one.
The court held that "under subdivision one, the automatic release is
at the tenant's option and only covers the question of surrender of
the lease and vacating the premises, while subdivision two gives the
tenant an additional remedy by requiring the landlord's
refusal to
4
consent to a sublease to contain reasons therefor.""1
The argument that subdivision two provides the powerful remedy allowing tenants to force landlords to accept reasonable sublessees was no less "creative" in Conrad than it was in Kruger."15 But,
as in Kruger, there were indications that a multifaceted approach,
applied to the section 226-b problem, led the Conrad court to infer
the remedy from a combination of common law, legislative history,
106. Id.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

N.Y.L.J., Jan. 27, 1981, at 5, cal. 3T (App. Term 1st Dep't 1981).
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 1981, at 10, col. 7B (App. Term 1st Dep't 1981).
N.Y.L.J., March 10, 1981, at 6, col. 4T (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1981).
Id.
N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1981, at 10, col. 6B (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1981).
Id.
81 A.D.2d 50, 439 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1st Dep't 1981).
Id. at 55, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 379.

115. See text accompanying notes 76-85 supra.
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and public policy support. The Conrad court noted that at common
law, the tenant had an unrestricted right to sublease."' The court
also expressly adopted many of the arguments made by Justice
Asch, dissenting in Lexann, with regard to the legislative intent, observing that "this legislation was passed to increase a tenant's right
and provide him with a modicum of negotiating capacity during a
period of housing shortages. .

. To deny such bonafide subleasing

right would indeed make a mockery of the statute. ' 11 7 Plaintiff Conrad was permitted to sublease her apartment, less because subdivision two of the statute allowed her to do so, than because any other
interpretation would have rendered the statute meaningless, and the
prohibition against unreasonable refusal by the landlord ineffective." 8
The controversy over whether section 226-b affords tenants a
single remedy, as the Remsen, Pacer, and Lexann opinions suggest,
or multiple remedies, as perceived in Kruger and Conrad, is likely to
continue. Faced with a weak common law foundation and an ambiguous legislative history, some courts, in resolving the remedy issue,
have opted for a literal interpretation of the statutory language,
while others have adopted a less literal view by relying on a multiplicity of factors external to the statute itself. Even if Conrad proves
to be the final word on remedies available to a tenant in the event of
a landlord's unreasonable refusal to accept a proposed sublease, the
litigation concerning section 226-b may well continue on several
other fronts. These potentialities are discussed in detail in the following sections.
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF SECTION

226-B

The continuing litigation involving 226-b has focused primarily
on the question of remedies available to tenants under the statute.
Even assuming arguendo that Conrad is the final word on the question of remedies, however, there remain other complex issues, which
have been left largely unaddressed by the courts, but which could
inject substantial controversy into the already confused arena of residential subleasing in New York. First is the problem of the disparate
impact of the statute's operation (inextricably tied to the question of
available remedies) on prospective assignors on the one hand, and
116. 81 A.D.2d at 53, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
117. Id. at 57, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
118. Id. at 55-56, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 379-80.
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prospective sublessors on the other. Second is the issue of the development of a uniform standard of reasonableness specifically suited to
section 226-b transfers. Finally, there is the problem of determining
the policy underlying the statute (a task that has evidently been delegated to the judiciary by the legislature), in light of current realities
in the housing market and, in particular, New York City's complicated rent-control structure. Each of these issues is discussed herein,
hypothetically where necessary, with an eye towards the comprehensive recommendations which follow.
Inherent Inequity
The most outstanding defect of section 226-b, the apparently
unintentional division of tenants into two distinct classes under the
statute-sublessors and assignors-may be incurable except through
legislative action. In order to demonstrate the unbalanced effect of
the statute on prospective sublessors as compared to prospective assignors, it is necessary to examine in detail precisely what right is
conferred on tenants under the statute, keeping in mind that the
"Right to sublease," (and later, "Right to sublease or assign"), so
often referred to in the statute may prove to be quite elusive.
As a prerequisite to any such examination, however, the distinction between a sublease and an assignment must be considered. Although a notion prevails that the two terms are virtually synonymous,"' the majority rule is that a sublease is a grant by a tenant of

an interest in the demised premises less than his own, retaining to
himself a reversion,1 20 while an assignment is a grant by a tenant of
his entire interest in the demised premises. 2 Thus, it would appear
that the statute entitled "Right to sublease ' ' a22 would be a grant of a
single right to tenants,
while the amended statute entitled "Right to
sublease or assign' 123 would bestow two distinct and separate rights.
119.

Halper, Assignment and Subletting by Tenants, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1977, at 1, col.

2B. Many businessmen, in fact, believe the terms are identical except as to whom the rent is
tendered. Id. at 6.
120. Stewart v. Long Island R.R., 102 N.Y. 601, 8 N.E. 200 (1886); Woodhull v. Rosenthal, 61 N.Y. 382 (1875); Howard Stores Corp. v. Robison Rayon Co., 64 Misc. 2d 913,
315 N.Y.S.2d 720 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1970), affid, 36 A.D.2d 911, 320 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1st
Dep't 1970); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 151 Misc. 894, 273
N.Y.S. 647 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1933), affd, 241 A.D. 813, 271 N.Y.S. 953 (Ist Dep't 1934),
affd, 266 N.Y. 254, 194 N.E. 745 (1935).
121. See cases cited note 120 supra.

122.

1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 146 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (Mc-

Kinney Supp. 1980-1981)).
123. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
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Under Conrad and Kruger, no distinction was drawn between
an assignment and a sublease. This approach has "been followed in
Brager v. Berkeley Associates. 24 Under the Remsen, Pacer and
Lexann decisions, however, only a right to assign has really been
granted. The right to sublease has vanished: a curious anomaly
which bears close scrutiny.
It is beneficial to consider two hypothetical New York City tenants. Ted, a business executive, has just been permanently transferred to San Francisco. Tina, a schoolteacher, has just purchased a
share in a Southampton cottage for the months of July and August.
Both have located unobjectionable subtenants, Ted agreeing to assign the remainder of his lease term, and Tina agreeing to sublease
for the two months in question, planning to return in September.
Notifying their respective landlords, both Ted and Tina receive unreasonable refusals. Under Conrad, of course, both transactions
would be upheld by the court. Under the Lexann interpretation of
the statute, however, Ted would be off to San Francisco in no time,
while Tina would be stuck paying for two dwellings for the summer.
In other words, Ted, the prospective assignor,after the unreasonable
refusal, will be satisfied to request and be granted a release from his
obligation to tender rent. Tina, the prospective sublessor, wishing to
retain her reversion, will be both unwilling to request a release and
unable to sublease, and will incur a financial loss in the end.
Prior to the Lexann and Conrad decisions, no court had even
alluded to the existence of this inequity. Even in Lexann, the court
for the most part glossed over this pitfall, on the one hand stating,
"RPL 226-b affords protection to a tenant who, for one reason or
another must, of necessity, either temporarily or permanently give
up his or her apartment, ' 125 while in almost the next breath
conceding:
For certain tenants who wish to or must absent themselves from
their apartments for protracted periods of time, but who intend to
return prior to the termination of their leases, our construction of
RPL 226-b may constitute a hardship. In such a case, if a landlord
unreasonably withholds his consent to sublet, the tenant will have
to elect whether to fulfill his obligation under the lease, without
offsetting the expense by income derived from subletting the apart124. 111 Misc. 2d 333, 337, 444 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357-58 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1981). The
Kruger court noted that the transaction should retain the character of a sublease. 105 Misc. 2d

at 34-35, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
125.

107 Misc. 2d at 78, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
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of his obligations under the lease
ment, or request a termination
126
and surrender the apartment.
This cannot have been the logically intended effect of a statute
expressly enacted to protect tenants from the vagaries of the existing
housing crunch. Such a result goes only half way towards a solution
to the apartment shortage, since only the assignors under the statute
will be permitted to turn over their units. Sublessors, i.e., those tenants unwilling to accept release, will be left occupying two units for
the term of the proposed sublease, however, thereby actually contributing in a major way to the shortage. If this is truly the valid interpretation of the statute entitled, "Right to sublease or assign," and
only a right to assign has been granted, the statute would have been
meaningless when it was entitled "Right to sublease" in its first and
second versions. It was this inequity to which the Conrad court
objected.1 27
The Rule of Reason
Another foreseeable problem with the application of section
226-b is the lack of a residential standard of reasonableness to be
used by the courts in evaluating a landlord's response to a tenant's
notice of his intent to sublease. Clearly, statements such as "We do
not choose to have apartments passed from hand to hand" 128 fall
short of any definition of reasonableness. And mere general objections to assignments that do not relate to the individual proposed
assignee may not meet such a standard. 2 9 Yet it is all too easy to
envision an instance where the unreasonableness of a landlord's withholding of consent is far less obvious, and where the ultimate determination of reasonableness is a much more difficult matter. Such
cases have arisen in the area of commercial leases,13 0 though the
question has not yet been ruled upon with regard to*section 226-b.
Thus, any discussion of the reasonableness standard as it currently
applies to residential leases under section 226-b must necessarily rely
126. Id.
127. 81 A.D.2d at 56-57, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
128. Kruger v. Page Management Co., 105 Misc. 2d 14, 17, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295, 298
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980).
129. Brager v. Berkeley Assocs., I11 Misc. 2d 333, 338, 444 N.Y.S.2d 355, 358 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1981).
130. See, e.g., Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So.2d 1035 (Ala. 1977); Westchester Coalition, Inc. v. Crest Realties, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 2, 1980, at 14, col. 3M (Sup. Ct.
West. Cty. 1980); American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Found., Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 297
N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1969).
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on principles extrapolated from the realm of commercial lease law.
The standard of reason now in force generally with regard to
commercial leases in New York state was originally set forth in
American Book Co. v. Yeshiva University Development Foundation,
Inc.131 In that case, a four-point objective test for a proposed subtenant's acceptability was laid down, the criteria consisting of the subtenant's financial responsibility, the identity or business character of
the subtenant, the legality of the proposed use, and the nature of the
occupancy.132 These standards were considered to be readily measurable by any landlord,1 38 and in fact, the American Book Co. standard has found its way into the case law of at least two other jurisdictions."' These so-called objective standards were further placed
in juxtaposition to subjective criteria-a category including the landlord's supposed needs, dislikes, personal taste, sensibility, or convenience 1 ---which courts will generally find objectionable and therefore irrelevant.
Even in view of this now-accepted rule of reason, however, the
standard of reasonableness required under section 226-b remains
mysterious. It is evident that the American Book Co. standard is a
peculiarly commercial standard, rather than the residential standard
that would appear to be necessitated by the statute; and while the
first objective criterion of the American Book Co. standard -subtenant's financial responsiblity-makes the transition from commercial applicability to residential applicability rather easily, the same
cannot be true of the remaining criteria, which are relevant only to
the business sublessee1 36 In fact, the potential for abuse inherent in
the application of the remaining criteria, even in a commercial-lease
situation, has been duly noted in cases where a discriminatory refusal by a landlord has been based on the identity of the proposed
131.

59 Misc. 2d 31, 297 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1969). The case deals with

a commercial lease, but the reasonableness test set forth is nowhere specifically limited to
commercial leases. Id.
132. Id. at 33, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 159-60.
133. Id.
134. See Jones v. Andy Griffith Prod., Inc., 35 N.C. App. 170, 241 S.E.2d 140, (1978);
Kroger Co. v. Rossford Indus. Corp., 25 Ohio Misc. 43, 43, 261 N.E.2d 355, 356 (Ct. Com.
P1. 1969).
135. 59 Misc. 2d at 34-35, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 160-61.
136. For a fuller discussion of the reasonableness standard applicable to commercial

leases, see Todres & Lerner, Assignment and Subletting of Leased Premises: The Unreasonable Witholding [sic] of Consent, 5 FORDHAM URE. L.J. 195 (1975); Note, Lessor's Rejection
of Sublease Agreement, Pursuant to a Consent Clause, Must Be Judged Under a Reasonable
Commercial Standard, 9 CUM. L. REV. 309 (1977).
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subtenant.13 7

In spite of the commercial nature of the American Book Co.
reasonableness test, the standard has been relied on expressly in
cases arising under section 226-b.138 The Remsen court noted that
the reasonableness of the landlord's refusal was the "threshhold issue
to be determined," 13 9 and proceeded to find the landlord's refusal to
be unreasonable under the American Book Co. standard. The Kruger court cited the reluctance of appellate courts to delineate such a
standard fully and clearly,1 40 and then applied the American Book

Co. test anyway, finding the landlord's refusal to be likewise unreasonable. 141 In so doing, each failed to consider the commercial/residential distinction, possibly because in both cases the refusal was
clearly unreasonable under any standard. 42
Inevitably, similar cases will arise under section 226-b in which
the question of unreasonableness of a landlord's refusal is open to
interpretation. Since several of the American Book Co. criteria will
be difficult or impossible to apply (legality of the proposed use, for
example, will be the same in all residential cases), courts may be
forced to develop their own criteria-a situation that might easily
lead to a range of conflicting results. Yet the courts are not without
guidance should they be obliged to evolve their own standard.
In an attempt to arrive at a viable residential standard of reasonableness, The Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code set a
seven-point test,1 43 which provided grounds for refusal if the landlord
137. See, e.g., Westchester Coalition, Inc. v. Crest Realties, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 2, 1980,
at 14, col. 3M (Sup. Ct. West. Cty. 1980). In Westchester Coalition, the defendant-landlord
refused to consent to a proposed sublease to a plaintiff nonprofit corporation, which provided

legal representation for the poor. The building in question had a policy of being reserved for
law offices, yet the landlord contended that the plaintiff sublessee was unsuited to the premises.
Id.
138. E.g., Brager v. Berkeley Assocs., 111 Misc. 2d 333, 338, 444 N.Y.S.2d 355, 358
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1981); Kruger v. Page Management Co., 105 Misc. 2d 14, 23, 432
N.Y.S.2d 295, 302 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980); 39 Remsen Co. v. Braune, N.Y.L.J., July 17,
1980, at 11. col. 5M (Civ. Ct. Kings Cty. 1980).
139. N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1980, at 11, col. 5M.
140. 105 Misc. 2d at 23, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
141. Id. at 23, 34, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 302, 308.
142. See Todres & Lerner, supra note 136, at 207: "An example of a per se unaccept-

able reason would be any reason that is subjective rather than objective."
143. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-403(5) (Tent. Draft 1969).
Grounds listed are:
(a) insufficient credit standing or financial responsibility, (b) number of persons in
the proposed household, (c) number of persons under 18 in the proposed household,
(d) unwillingness of the prospective tenant to assume the same terms as are included in the existing rental agreement, (e) proposed maintenance of pets, (f) pro-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss2/9

24

Kaufman: The Right to Sublease in New York: Application of Real Property L
1982]

THE RIGHT TO SUBLEASE

was able to show that the proposed subtenant would not be as
favorable to him as the original tenant.144 This test was embraced by
the state of Alaska in drafting its own sublease statute, 145 and is
favorable to the tenant in that the burden of proof is placed squarely
on the landlord. 1" New York State, however, has not adopted the
pertinent sections of this model code.
The lack of a strictly residential standard of reasonableness can
lead only to uncertainty for both landlords and tenants as to their
respective rights under section 226-b, especially in close cases. The
nebulous American Book Co. standard is unwieldly in a residential
situation and lends itself to landlord discrimination. A more narrowly defined standard of reasonableness would limit the litigation
on this issue to only the most borderline refusals and would additionally protect tenants (and subtenants) against unfairly discriminating
landlords.
Housing Market Realities and Section 226-b
One final note concerning the technical economic effect of section 226-b is necessary. The housing shortage in New York, as
noted, continues to be a troublesome situation. 47 It is conceivable
that this situation will someday change, but, unfortunately, it is
often impossible, or at best impracticable, to alter a statute to meet
changing economic realities, especially when such changes occur
suddenly and without notice. When the market variable-i.e., the
possibility that the housing market may be rising or falling-is factored into the section 226-b equation, it can be seen that the statute,
which was designed to aid tenants, may actually work to give the
landlords an advantage in coping with cyclical shifts.
Essentially, in a falling market, the landlord is protected from
substantial risk of income interruption or diminution by the lease
provisions rendering the tenant liable to tender rent for the remainder of the term. The tenant, on the other hand, bears the risk that
posed commercial activity, (g) written information signed by a previous landlord,which shall accompany the rejection, setting forth abuses of other premises occupied
by the prospective subtenant.
Id.
144.
145.

Id.; see Note, supra note 136, at 317 n.66.
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.060 (1975).

146. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-403(6) (Tent. Draft 1969).
147. See 7 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER AND CODE § Y51-1.0 (1975); id. §
YY51-1.0 (describing the existing situation as an emergency, and outlining the need for
legislation).
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his rent may become too high relative to the decreasing price similar
units command as they re-enter the deteriorating market. As the
drop in comparable prices occurs, the tenant may desire to vacate his
dwelling unit in favor of one whose rental more closely reflected the
changing pricing environment. In this case, the same lease provision
that serves to protect the landlord-one that prohibits subletting
without consent-will severely limit the tenant's mobility, in effect
forcing him to retain the now-expensive apartment until the expiration of the lease. Thus, in this falling market situation, a tenant's
ability to avail himself of a section 226-b sublease would depend on
his ability to locate a prospective sublessee willing to pay a rent
higher than that being asked for a comparable apartment.
Conversely, in a rising market, it is the landlord who finds himself locked into an increasingly less profitable agreement, while the
tenant discovers his leasehold becoming a more and more valuable
asset. A tenant may wish to sublease for personal reasons, or he may
simply wish to capitalize on his good fortune by means of a sublease
or assignment at a higher rental. Under the Lexann interpretation of
the statute, the landlord, by his unreasonable refusal to consent to
the proposed sublease or assignment, may deny the tenant the opportunity for financial gain.148 Carrying this analysis a step further, if
the tenant then, out of necessity, requests a release from the lease
(as Ted, the hypothetical assignor, did), the landlord may actually
rerent to the same proposed sublessee or assignee at the higher
rental, thereby netting a profit for himself at the expense of the original tenant, who is frozen out of the transaction. Indeed, the landlord will also have obtained a service from the tenant for free: that of
rental agent for the landlord, successfully locating a free-spending
subtenant agreeable to the higher rental.
Thus, in a purely free-market housing economy, section 226-b
would allow the landlord, already well-protected against a falling
market, to retain all the opportunity for financial gain inherent in a
148. See 107 Misc. 2d at 78, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 837. The Lexann court held that, "we do
not perceive [226-b] to sanction what would amount to a form of trafficking in apartments by
tenants, an inevitable consequence of permitting a tenant to insist upon subletting where the
landlord has refused to consent thereto, albeit 'unreasonably.'" Id. The Conrad court, however, held that the Lexann court ignored the legislature's intent in reaching this conclusion. 81
A.D.2d at 57, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
149. Even under the most favorable (to tenants) decision, the tenant was prevented from
making a profit, although there the landlord was likewise prohibited from reaping any financial
reward. See Kruger v. Page Management Co., 105 Misc. 2d 14, 33, 432 N.Y.S.2d 297, 308
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980).
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rising market. Conversely, the tenant would continue to bear the entire risk of being locked into an inflexible position during his tenancy
in a falling market, while being effectively excluded from any potential profit to be garnered from a buoyant housing environment.
In New York City, where a majority of the section 226-b cases
have arisen, however, it is clear that a truly free housing market does
not exist, for various rent-control programs have been in effect since
1943.15O And, in a very real sense, the present rent-control program

provides a final incentive for New York City landlords to refuse to
consent to a proposed sublease unreasonably. Simply stated, a subtenant in a rent-controlled building effectively steps into the shoes of

the original tenant under section twenty-one of the Code of the Real
Estate Industry Stabilization Association of New York, Inc.,151 and

is therefore entitled to a renewal lease at the controlled level.1 52 Installation of a totally new tenant, on the other hand, will enable the

landlord to raise the maximum rent, 8' thereby increasing his profit
margin to the allowable limit. The rationale behind a rent-stabilized
landlord's refusal to consent to a proposed sublease is purely eco-

nomic: A section 226-b release of the tenant is an almost certain
money-maker in a tight housing market.
RECOMMENDATIONS

It would be shameful to allow so potentially progressive a measure as section 226-b 5 4 to become indefinitely mired in a legal morass due solely to careless drafting. Regardless of the outcome of any
pending or future litigation, the statute should be amended or rewritten. A statute worded more clearly in favor of the tenant, however,
150. Niebank, Rent Control and the Rental Housing Market-New York City 1968,
Report for the City of New York Housing and Development Administration, Department of
Rent and Housing Maintenance (Jan. 1970) at 191; see 7 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER
AND CODE § 51-1.0 (1975); id. § YY51-1.0. In both the present housing shortage continues to
be attributed to the Second World War.
151. Code of the Real Estate Industry Stabilization Association of the City of New
York, Inc. § 21, reprinted in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8617, at 601-16 (McKinney 1974)
[hereinafter cited at Real Estate Industry Code]; see 68th St. Co. v. Fyjis-Walker, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 29, 1980, at 10, col. 7B (App. Term 1st Dep't 1980), rev'd, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 1981, at 10,
col. 7B (App. Term 1st Dep't 1981).
152. Real Estate Industry Code, supra note 151, § 23; see 68th St. Co. v. Fyjis-Walker,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, at 10, col. 7B (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1980), rev'd, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 1981, at
10, col. 7B (App. Term 1st Dep't 1981).
153. See 7 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER AND CODE § YY51-5.0(d) (1975).
154. See note 3 supra.
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would set off a howl of landlord protest. 155 Therefore, a major consideration must be the balancing of landlord and tenant interests into
a cohesive bill that protects both sides against inequitable application. With this consideration in mind, the following recommendations for an equitable statute are offered, together with explanations
of their underlying rationales:
1. Any new statute should clearly state that the tenant "shall
have the right to sublease or assign in any event other than that of
a reasonable refusal to consent by the landlord." It should state
further: "In the event of an unreasonable refusal by the landlord,
the tenant shall have the right, at the tenant's option, to request
and be granted release from the lease, or to proceed with or continue the sublease."
This paragraph simply sets forth the rights of the tenant in unambiguous language, adopting the Conrad/Krugerview of the true
purpose of section 226-b, and supports public-policy considerations
favoring free alienation of property. 158
2. A new and comprehensive residential standard of reasonableness, identical or similar to that contained in the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code157 and the Alaska statute158 should
be explicitly included in any New York enactment.
Although a serious question of reasonableness has not yet arisen
under the recent section 226-b decisions, directly incorporating a residential standard within the statute itself will present an improvement over the nebulous American Book Co. commercial standard, 159
and will serve to limit or prevent future litigation on this issue in all
but borderline cases.
3. Any new statute should unequivocally place the burden of
proof as to the reasonableness of any contested refusal upon the
landlord.
155. See Brakel & McIntyre, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
(URLTA) In Operation: Two Reports, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 555, 573-74 (1980).
Commenting on general landlord reaction to the adoption of portions of the URLTA in Oregon and Ohio, the authors observed: "Landlords or their representatives can hardly be expected to be enthusiastic about pro-tenant legislation." Id. at 573. The URLTA is the successor to the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code. Id. at 560.
156. See, e.g., De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 493 (1852).
157. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-403(5) (Tent. Draft 1969).
158. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.060 (1975).
159. 59 Misc. 2d at 33, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 159-60.
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This would be in keeping with a presumption of validity of a
proposed sublease, and would deter landlords from raising unreasonable objections solely in the hope that the offending tenant will surrender in the face of a protracted and costly legal skirmish. Landlords as a class will be better able to expend the resources necessary
to rebut any presumption of reasonableness, and will likewise be better situated to pass through any increased litigation costs to tenants.
A similar provision is included in the Alaska subleasing statute.16 0
4. Any new statute should provide that the landlord may require his or her tenant to submit a document stating the terms of
the sublease, including rental. If this rental represents an increase
over the amount of the original lease, the landlord should be entitled to two-thirds of any increase.
This provision would offer an incentive to the landlord to consent to any proposed sublease, allowing the tenant, in effect, to serve
as a rental agent for the landlord in return for a 33% commission.
The landlord, for his part, will retain a healthy portion of any rent
increase, and, in addition, will avoid many of the advertising and
investigative costs involved in finding a suitable tenant. This provision would work in conjunction with subdivision two of the current
statute," which provides for the original tenant's continued liability
to the landlord for rent, encouraging the tenant to find a truly suitable subtenant, while at the same time protecting the landlord against
cash flow interruption in the event the subtenant turns out to be
financially irresponsible. Subdivision two would be retained in its
current form under this proposal.
5. The New York City Rent Stabilization Law 162 should be
amended to allow landlords to increase the rent to the sublessee by
the maximum amount permitted on a vacancy lease, but only at
the expiration of the original tenant's lease term.
This amendment to the New York City Code would eliminate a
major impetus for landlords to refuse to consent to a proposed sublease, actually placing the landlord in a better position than if the
original tenant had remained in the apartment and requested a renewal lease. Assignees would be the eventual losers here, subject to
vacancy increases upon the expiration of the original tenant's term.
160.
161.

162.

ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.060 (1975).
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
7 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER AND CODE §§ YY51-1.0 to YY51-8.0 (1975

& Supp. 1980-1981).
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Yet, section 226-b was passed to protect tenants-in-fact, not prospective transferees; automatically to entitle assignees to renewal leases
would invite fraud by vacating tenants, who could (for a fee) enter
into an assignment just prior to vacating, depriving landlords of the
allowable increase.
CONCLUSION

Section 226-b of the New York Real Property Law has contributed in a major way to an increasingly uncertain environment in the
area of New York residential subleasing law. Problems have already
appeared with the interpretation of the measure regarding the availability of the tenant's remedy of implementation or continuation of
the sublease. The statute also appears susceptible to several foreseeable problems involving its disparate effect on sublessors and assignors, the lack of an applicable reasonableness standard, and the failure to provide for the idiosyncracies of a government-controlled
housing market. The hope for a resolution to these problems lies in
amendments to the statutory scheme that will balance the competing
interests of landlords and tenants.
Stephen L. Kaufman
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